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Abstract. PGP is built upon a Distributed Web of Trust in which a
user’s trustworthiness is established by others who can vouch through a
digital signature for that user’s identity. Preventing its wholesale adop-
tion are a number of inherent weaknesses to include (but not limited
to) the following: 1) Trust Relationships are built on a subjective honor
system, 2) Only first degree relationships can be fully trusted, 3) Levels
of trust are difficult to quantify with actual values, and 4) Issues with
the Web of Trust itself (Certification and Endorsement). Although the
security that PGP provides is proven to be reliable, it has largely failed
to garner large scale adoption. In this paper, we propose several novel
contributions to address the aforementioned issues with PGP and asso-
ciated Web of Trust. To address the subjectivity of the Web of Trust, we
provide a new certificate format based on Bitcoin which allows a user to
verify a PGP certificate using Bitcoin identity-verification transactions
- forming first degree trust relationships that are tied to actual values
(i.e., number of Bitcoins transferred during transaction). Secondly, we
present the design of a novel Distributed PGP key server that leverages
the Bitcoin transaction blockchain to store and retrieve Bitcoin-Based
PGP certificates. Lastly, we provide a web prototype application that
demonstrates several of these capabilities in an actual environment.
In a recent article, Yahoo announced its intentions to add an extension that
will provide its customers with the ability to digitally sign and encrypt mes-
sages using Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). Yahoo plans to use a fork of Google’s
End to End OpenPGP plugin that is currently in development. Yahoo follows
the likes of Google, Facebook and Microsoft, who also recently announced they
would encrypt internal traffic in response to the Snowden spying revelations [1].
Traditional methods of securely sharing between two or more parties rely on the
use of Public-Key Encryption within a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In a
traditional PKI scheme, a certificate authority or certification authority (CA)
is an entity that issues digital certificates. The digital certificate certifies the
ownership of a public key by the named subject of the certificate. This allows
others (relying parties) to rely upon signatures or assertions made by the private
key that corresponds to the public key that is certified. In this model of trust
relationships, a CA is a Trusted Third Party (TTP) that is trusted by both the
? Department of Computer Science, Johns Hopkins University
?? Department of Computer Science, Sapienza University of Rome
ar
X
iv
:1
50
8.
04
86
8v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
1 A
ug
 20
15
subject (owner) of the certificate and the party relying upon the certificate. CAs
are characteristic of many PKI schemes. [2]. Currently, the most viable alterna-
tive for Public Key Crytography based on a CA is PGP. PGP is built upon a
Distributed Web of Trust in which a user’s trustworthiness is established by oth-
ers who can vouch for that user’s identity. Preventing its wholesale adoption are
a number of inherent weaknesses to include (but not limited to) the following:
– Trust Relationships are built on a subjective honor system
– Only first degree relationships can be fully trusted
– Levels of trust are difficult to quantify with actual values
– Issues specific to the Web of Trust:
1. Certification. It is currently difficult to get certified if the key is new.
In general people complain that it is hard to find endorsers to enhance
the trustworthiness of a new key - which will limit its use.
2. Endorsement. Competence and willingness of endorsers. There is cur-
rently no incentive to endorse a key of someone you know - much less
someone you indirectly know through a friend or relative.
Bitcoin is a form of digital currency, created and held electronically [3]. Ac-
cording to “Crypto Coin News”, the number of active Bitcoin users worldwide
will reach 4.7 million by the end of 2019, marking a significant gain over the 1.3
million last year, according to a report from Juniper Research [4]. As a result of
its popularity, we introduce a new Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate format, certifi-
cate validation methodology, and certificate endorsement model that overcomes
the issues we have highlighted above. Issues 1 and 2 with the Web of Trust can
be easily solved using our new Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate format and verifi-
cation system. Issue 4 can be resolved by use of endorsement fee. The amount of
the fee can be determined by the user and will vary based on the current value
of a Bitcoin - which has been relatively stable of late [5]. In Issue 2, the bitcoin
payment ensures that the endorser follows the “authentication” procedure oth-
erwise they risk losing bitcoins - which demonstrates both their competence and
willingness to serve as a viable certificate endorser.
There are some interesting properties of our trust establishment protocol
that could result in safer use of PGP. Property 1) People have the option of
using previous transactions before using a certificate OR directly establishing a
trust relationship themselves with a certificate owner (i.e., direct trust). Property
2) As mentioned above, because of the risk of losing bitcoins via the identity-
verification process, people will be less likely to leverage our certificates without a
direct trust establishment. Property 3) The block chain and associated identity-
verification transactions provide transparency into the trustworthiness of others.
In addition to these benefits, we also provide the design of a novel PGP Key
Server based on the blockchain’s ability to store pieces of data since the 0.9.0
release. The 0.9.0 release of Bitcoin Core added a new standard transaction
type granting access to a previously disallowed script function, OP-RETURN
[6]. This function accepts a user-defined sequence of up to 40 bytes (now 80
bytes in current release). Once realized, this new key server will be completely
de-centralized and serve as an appropriate repository for Bitcoin-Based PGP
Certificates. Our work specifically provides the following contributions:
– Bitcoin-Based PGP Certificate: Contains Bitcoin address for identity
verification and certificate revocation.
– Identity-Verification and Revocation Transactions: Serves as alter-
native means of verifying a certificate owner’s Public Key contained in a
Bitcoin-Based PGP Certificate. Also provides a mechanism for certificate
revocation using the embedded Bitcoin address for revocation purposes.
– PGP Trust Levels: Allows users to specify the amount of Bitcoins they are
willing to “risk” in order to verify a particular Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate.
This amount (determined by the verifier) now attests to level of trust the
verifier has in the certificate owner.
– Certificate Signing Endorsements: Adds small incentive fee (via Bit-
coin) each time an endorser (with a valid Bitcoin address) signs an Enhanced
PGP Certificate stored on Bitcoin-Based PGP Key Server.
– Bitcoin-Based PGP Key Server Design: Demonstrates method of
using the Bitcoin Transaction Blockchain for PGP Key Storage. Offers a
completely decentralized client-based software application that allows users
to efficiently store and retrieve Bitcoin-Based PGP certificates within the
blockchain. Application will separate certificate into individual pieces to fit
within the allowed number of bytes and store within blockchain - as append
only data. Similarly, upon request (e.g., based on PGP Key ID or similar),
client will facilitate the retrieval of PGP certificate fragments and reassemble
them for use by requesting user.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the work
related to this area of research, Section 3 provides a background of the current
PGP Public Key Certificate format as a context for our Bitcoin-Based PGP
certificate, Section 4 presents an overview of PGP threats addressed by our
contributions, Section 5 discusses the design details of our prototype application
and new key server, Section 6 provides relevant sample output from the primary
prototype functions, and Section 7 concludes the paper and identifies areas for
future work.
1 Related Work
This section examines previous work that proposes novel methods to protect
the confidentiality of data in an uncontrolled network-accessible environment
without the aid of a Certificate Authority (CA). According to [7], BitPay has
launched a project that leverages bitcoin technology to facilitate a decentralized
authentication system. Called BitAuth, the system uses cryptographic signatures
in place of server-side password storage. BitAuth is a way to do secure, pass-
wordless authentication using the same elliptic-curve cryptography as Bitcoin.
Instead of using a shared secret, the client signs each request using a private key
and the server checks to make sure the signature is valid and matches the public
key. A nonce is used to prevent replay attacks and provide sequence enforce-
ment [8]. Similar to our novel Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate, BitAuth provides
“portable” identity in that the same identity can be used with (or on) multiple
services. BitAuth is a promising new method of authentication, but currenly re-
lies heavily on the System Identification Number (SIN). The SIN is a new concept
that is similar to a Bitcoin address, however, is not widely adopted. Whereas,
our scheme relies on popular Bitcoin primitives - address, transactions, and the
block chain - that are widely being used. Additionally, since the focus of BitAuth
is on authentication, it cannot be used to protect the confidentiality of informa-
tion shared between two parties - as is the primary benefit of our Bitcoin-Based
PGP Certificate.
Off-the-Record (OTR) Messaging is a protocol designed for private social
communications. According to [9,10], the notion of an off-the-record conversa-
tion captures the semantics one intuitively wants from private communication -
only the two parties involved are privy to the contents of the conversation; after
the conversation is over, no one (not even the parties involved) can produce a
transcript; and although the participants are assured of each other’s identities,
neither they nor anyone else can prove this information to a third party. Current
versions of the OTR protocol, support mutual authentication of users using a
shared secret through the socialist minimalist protocol. This feature makes it
possible for users to verify the identity of the remote party and avoid a man-
in-the-middle attack without the inconvenience of manually comparing public
key fingerprints through an outside channel. OTR’s primary weakness lies in
the fact that it is primarily applicable in the domain of instant messaging -
whereas our Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate can be used in virtually any domain
in which secure information sharing is desired. According to the authors of the
OTR protocol, “The high latency of email communication makes using our“off-
the-record” protocol impractical in the setting of email.”
In [11], a secure replacement for CAs is proposed. Rather than employing a
traditionally hard-coded list of immutable CAs, Convergence allows one to con-
figure a dynamic set of Notaries which use network perspective to validate user
communications. It provides the following guarantees: Trust Agility, Robustness,
Backwards Compatibility, Extensibility and Anonymity. This all occurs within
a distributed environment in which anyone can serve as a trust notary. Conver-
gence originated from the ideas originally developed by the Perspectives Project
at Carnegie Mellon University [12]. Convergence has great promise in the do-
main of web browser security and other areas where SSL is prominent. However,
it suffers from the fact that the number of notaries currently in existence for
performing CA functions is limited (due to it being a fairly new effort). As a
result, this could lead to potential Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in the event
the notaries become overwhelmed with requests. The Bitcoin infrastructure -
upon which our certificate primarily relies - has successfully processed nearly 40
million transactions (to date) [13]. This makes it robust against volume-based
security attacks such as DoS and DDoS - when applicable.
2 Public-Key Digital Certificates
In this section we discuss the differences between the traditional PGP Certifi-
cate and our novel Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate which leverages aspects of the
Bitcoin infrastructure to address the shortcomings of existing PGP certificate
web of trust model.
2.1 PGP Certificates
PGP is a public key cryptographic package, which is intended for public usage.
It provides sender authenticity, message integrity and non-repudiation of the
sender. Although PGP can encrypt any data or files, it is most commonly used for
e-mail which has no built-in security as originally implemented. It was originally
designed and developed by Phil Zimmermann in 1991. A PGP certificate includes
(not limited to) the following information [15]:
– PGP Version Number: This identifies which version of PGP was used to
create the key associated with the certificate.
– Certificate holder’s public key: This is the public portion of the key pair,
together with the algorithm of the key: RSA, Elgamal or DSA.
– Certificate holder’s information: This is information about the user,
such as his or her name, user ID, e-mail address, ICQ number, photograph,
or other identifier.
– Digital signature of the certificate owner: This item, also called a self-
signature, is the signature generated using the corresponding private key of
the public key associated with the certificate.
– Validity Period: The certificate’s start date/time and expiration date/-
time; indicates when the certificate will expire. If the key pair contains sub-
keys, then this includes the expiration of each of the encryption subkeys as
well. Subkeys enable convenient use of separate keys for signing and encryp-
tion.
– Preferred symmetric encryption algorithm for the key: This indi-
cates the encryption algorithm to which the certificate owner prefers to have
information encrypted by.
A PGP certificate identifies the owner of the public key and contains a sig-
nature of the key’s owner, which states that the key and the identification go
together. Each label contains a different means of identifying the key’s owner
(e.g., the owner’s name and corporate e-mail account, the owner’s nickname and
home e-mail account, a photograph of the owner - all in one certificate). A sin-
gle certificate can contain multiple signatures. Several or many people may sign
the key/identification pair to attest to their own assurance that the public key
definitely belongs to the specified owner. The list of signatures of each label may
differ. Signatures attest to the authenticity that one of the labels belongs to the
public key, not that all the labels on the key are authentic [16]. Unlike, X.509
certificate, PGP cerficates do not rely on a CA for identity-verification - but on
a Web of Trust. As this ‘web’ grows the reputation (or binding of the certificate
to the user identity therein) proportionally grows. Since PGP allows anyone to
be a ‘trusted introducer’ on the web of trust, the identity-verification could be
very subjective and easily exploited (e.g., by someone who simply signs each cer-
tificate he/she receives without verifying the requestor’s identity). This is very
similar to a facebook user who accepts all friend requests without confirming
whether or not they know the individual who sent the request. Additionally, as
mentioned above, because PGP has not been widely adopted and is difficult to
deploy, we seek to leverage Bitcoin to encourage a larger scale adoption of PGP.
In the following subsection, we present our Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate format
that builds on this concept of a web of trust to primarily overcome some of the
weaknesses inherent to the PGP.
2.2 Bitcoin-Based PGP Certificates
Bitcoin is an experimental, decentralized digital currency that enables instant
payments to anyone, anywhere in the world. Bitcoin uses peer-to-peer technology
to operate with no central authority: managing transactions and issuing money
are carried out collectively by the network. Bitcoin is designed around the idea
of using cryptography to control the creation and transfer of money, rather than
relying on central authorities [17,18]. Our Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate con-
tains all the relevant elements found in a traditional PGP Certificate but also
includes a Bitcoin Address for Identity-Verification and one used for Certificate
Revocation. A Bitcoin address is an identifier of 27-34 alphanumeric characters,
beginning with the number 1 or 3, that represents a possible destination for a
Bitcoin payment. A Bitcoin transaction is a signed section of data that is broad-
cast to the network and collected into blocks. It typically references previous
transaction(s) and dedicates a certain number of bitcoins from it to one or more
new public key(s) (Bitcoin address) [19]. Because transactions must be verified
by miners, Bitcoin users are sometimes forced to wait until they have finished
mining. The bitcoin protocol is set so that each block takes roughly 10 minutes
to mine. In the case of a purchase, some merchants may make users wait until
this block has been confirmed, which will delay the receipt of the digital goods
that have been paid for - whereas in other cases (e.g., low value transactions),
a merchant will give access to the goods prior to the transaction being verified
by the miners [20]. In our case, the delay does not pose a major problem since
it will only take place when a trust relationship is being established for the first
time - not upon certificate generation. The value of using Bitcoin in the con-
text of a PGP certificate centers around the fact that because it is built upon
a peer-to-peer network, it is able perform its functions (e.g., money transfers,
double-spending prevention) without the aid of a CA - similar to the traditional
web of trust. This is advantageous in any context where end-to-end data confi-
dentiality is needed or desired (e.g., email, text message, cloud sharing, or social
network communications). Users are more likely to trust an infrastructure that
is independent of any CAs, but can still offer the same cryptographic guarantees
(i.e., confidentiality and integrity) as an environment that is under their full
control or purview.
3 PGP Threats and Security Goals
In this section, we expound on the threats we identified in the introduction and
describe our security goals. We make the following assumptions as it pertains to
these threats.
1. The PGP users are leveraging the Web of Trust for certificate vetting.
2. The PGP user certificates are also capable of supporting a hierarchical struc-
ture and use of a CA (similar to the traditional X.509 certificate). However,
we make the assumption that a CA is not being used.
3. PGP users can assign a level of trust to another PGP user’s public key
4. PGP users can assign a level of validity to another PGP user’s public key
3.1 Threat Scenarios
Although there are a number of well documented issues with PGP, we primarily
focus on threats relating to certificate validation, endorsement, and trust rela-
tionship establishment. Other threats associated with PGP, such as privacy of
the Web of Trust and the fair exchange of Certificate Endorsers, are outside of
the scope of our research. One of the main issues with the Web of Trust model
is that beyond a first degree trust relationship, it is difficult to quantify trust.
As a result, it becomes a scenario that is relatively easy for an attacker to ex-
ploit. This is primarily due to the fact that within PGP, anyone can serve as a
trusted introducer (essentially a CA) to another individual. This is analogous to
a member of a social network accepting every friend request that he/she receives.
There is no way of knowing whether or not the individual being vouched for is
actually who they say they are - which makes this a very dangerous weakness of
the current PGP Web of Trust model.
One can mitigate the threat of compromise through use of our new Bitcoin-
Based PGP certificate and Public Key validation process. Recall that during the
identity-verification process, there is always the risk of losing the Bitcoins that
are sent to a Certificate Owner. However, in the event that the Bitcoins are not
returned (e.g., due to an adversarial threat or greedy Certificate Owner), the
more valuable commodity (the information) will be spared from being exposed.
In our new certificate, since we associate a Bitcoin Value with a trust relation-
ship, it is easy to infer (by examining previous identity-verification transactions),
how much an individual is trusted. By using Bitcoin as a form of trust estab-
lishment, as the number of transactions increase to a particular Bitcoin-Based
PGP certificate, the level of trust will also increase in the associated identity.
As mentioned above, the levels of trust with the PGP are difficult to rely on
with any certainty. There are 3 levels of trust that can be assigned to someone’s
Public Key within PGP: Complete Trust(2), Marginal Trust(1), or No Trust (0).
Similarly, there are also 3 levels of validity: Valid, Marginal Validity, or Invalid.
PGP requires at least 1 Completely Trusted signature or 2 Marginally Trusted
signatures to establish a Public Key as Valid [15]. Even with its numerical value
system that maps to a particular “level”, PGP users are subject to the loose
definitions of validity and trustworthiness of a PGP key. The highest level of
trust in a key, implicit trust, is trust in a Certificate Owner’s own key pair.
PGP assumes that if you own the private key, you must trust the actions of its
related public key [15]. However, beyond one’s own key pair, how can an actual
value be assigned to a trust relationship? This challenge arises when users are
asked to make security decisions. In a recent article, Michigan State University
professor Rick Walsh studies the reasoning process behind the decisions people
make that lead to computer security breaches [14]. His research shows that how
people visualize and conceptualize hackers and other cybercriminals affects their
cybersecurity decision-making. In the case of this threat, most users will assume
that the mere fact that they are using PGP makes them secure (i.e., their visu-
alization of the adversary). Hence, their concern of assigning an appropriately
level of validity or trust to another’s PGP key is unlikely. It is also likely the
case that there is a lack of understanding of what an appropriate designation
would be - unless training were provided or there was a physical trust relation-
ship between verifier and Certificate Owner.
With our new endorsement process offered via Bitcoin, this threat would
be mitigated by the following constructs of our scheme: 1) Certificate Signing
MUST precede the incentive fee. A fixed fee of 0.001 BTC is sent to the Bit-
coin address provided by the certificate endorser (fee is paid from the certificate
owner’s bitcoin address - as available). This fee cannot be modified by the certifi-
cate owner OR the endorser - however, it serves as a small incentive (e.g., Thank
You for Signing) to willing and competent endorsers, 2) Endorsement process is
not automated. Our prototype forces users to go through a step by step process
in order to sign a certificate stored on our server, and 3) Levels of Trust are es-
tablished by the certificate endorser, not certificate owner. In our scheme, when
performing an identity-verification transaction, any amount of Bitcoins can be
sent for verification purposes. These Bitcoins are ‘at risk’ until the certificate
owner returns them. As a result, this serves as a very clear indication of trust
between certificate endorser and owner. For example, one would risk more Bit-
coins in verifying a close friend’s PGP certificate than someone who was not in
his/her close circle of friends. As a last option, subsequent endorsers of a par-
ticular PGP key can glean levels of trust very easily prior to ‘risking’ their own
Bitcoins using an identify-verification transaction - as previously discussed.
A few additional threats to consider with leveraging Bitcoin as an alternative
method of certificate verification are those related to rogue certificate owners,
wealthy endorsers, and untrustworthy endorsers. In the first case, a certificate
owner can generate a PGP key and use it for collecting payments and never
return incoming identity-verification transactions to endorsers. To further com-
plicate this scenario, a wealthy endorser risks very little by endorsing such users.
To address these threats, we still rely on the PGP trust model that allows for
out-of-band methods of certificate verification and a web of trust. The inference
is that users will not initiate an identity-verification transaction with someone
they do not already know and trust from prior interactions. Additionally, in the
case of the wealthy endorser, only one verification transaction is considered valid
for a particular certificate. Thus, their credibility (over time) will come into ques-
tion as they continue to endorse untrustworthy certificates. Lastly, we consider
the scenario where endorsers are suspected of being malicious by endorsing ‘just
for the sake of endorsing’. Since our endorsement scheme does not invalidate -
but augments - the endorsement process provided by PGP, over time a mali-
cious endorser would be classified as someone who cannot be trusted - especially
if they are endorsing both questionable and legitimate certificates. A legitimate
case to consider is someone who is a professional certificate endorser. Someone
whose professional responsibility is to endorse new certificates has their job (and
reputation) to consider if they are found to be endorsing certificates that are not
legitimate - over time.
4 Prototype Design
In this section, we describe the implementation details of our prototype. The
prototype will be a hosted web application that will resemble a traditional Pub-
lic Key Certificate server. A Certificate or key server receives and serves existing
cryptographic keys to users or other computer programs. The keys distributed
by the key server are almost always provided as part of a cryptographically
protected identity certificate containing not only the key but also ’entity’ infor-
mation about the owner of the key. In the case of our Bitcoin-Based PGP Certifi-
cate server, the certificates will be in the OpenPGP public key format - with the
additional Bitcoin addresses for identity-verification and certificate revocation
as specified in section 3. The primary motivations for creating a new certifi-
cate server are to 1) Accommodate our new Bitcoin-Based PGP certificates, 2)
Enable Identity-Verification and Revocation transactions, and 3) Enable Certifi-
cate Signing Endorsements. To faciliate these “features”, our certificate server
provides the following functions: Generate, Revoke, Verify, and Sign. We discuss
each in the following sub-sections after which we detail the design of our novel
PGP Key server based on the blockchain as an area of future work.
4.1 Generate and Revoke
Our Bitcoin-Based PGP certificates are generated using the openpgp javacript
package - which is a javascript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. This
standard is defined by RFC4880. This package provides functions to encrypt
and sign your data and communication, features a versatile key management
system as well as access modules for all kinds of public key directories. As it
is designed for web-based devices, it can be used as an alternative to GnuPG,
also known as GPG, which is a command line tool with features for easy in-
tegration with other applications [22]. Each Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate will
contain a set of required parameters prior to generation and items that will be
automatically generated by the prototype application. One thing to note is that
our implementation does not require any modification of the original PGP cer-
tificate format. We leverage the key server to store both the identity-verification
and revocation addresses listed in the PGP comment field.
In PGP, users can revoke their certificate if they feel like the certificate has
been compromised. PGP also allows a user to designate a certificate revoker.
With PGP certificates, the user usually posts the revoked certificate on a certifi-
cate server. To enable an easier revocation process for our Bitcoin-Based PGP
certificate, we are able to take advantage of the the Bitcoin transaction block
chain for revocation purposes. The block chain is a transaction database shared
by all nodes participating in a system based on the Bitcoin protocol. A full
copy of a currency’s block chain contains every transaction ever executed in the
currency. With this information, one can find out how much value belonged to
each address at any point in Bitcoin history [23]. The immutable nature of the
Bitcoin Transaction Block chain makes it attractive from a certificate revocation
standpoint. To revoke a certificate, we perform a Bitcoin transaction between
the two Bitcoin addresses colocated in the Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate. This
transaction can only be performed by the certificate owner once authenticated.
Key revocation is arguably the most important component of any certificate-
based identification system. Our implementation deliberately forces the user to
make a valid Bitcoin transaction to a legitimate Bitcoin address in his possession.
Alternatively, the revocation status could be stored in OP-RETURN fields if our
decentralized approach is adopted (as explained later in the paper). Our current
method, however, has an important technical advantage: It makes verification of
a certificate status extremely efficient since revocation transactions will be stored
in the Bitcoin Unspent Transaction Outputs (UXTO) database and propagated
among all nodes automatically. The UXTO are redeemable transactions and
the information on certificate status will be kept in main memory for efficient
verification.
4.2 Verify and Sign
An identity-verification transaction is the primary mechanism by which a user
can verify another user’s Public Key in a Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate. We
accomplish this by associating a Bitcoin Address with each generated PGP cer-
tificate. To perform the Bitcoin Identity-Verification transactions, we leverage
the ‘jsonRPCClient’ library’s sendtoaddress function. This function sends a
specified amount from a server’s available balance to a specified bitcoin address.
It takes the following parameters:
– bitcoinaddress - Bitcoin address to send to.
– amount - Amount to send (float, rounded to the nearest 0.01).
– minconf - Minimum number of confirmations req’d for transferred balance.
– comment - Comment for transaction.
– comment-to - Comment for to-address.
The first step in an identity-verifcation transaction is to connect to a local
or remote bitcoin instance. In the case of our web server, users are required
to have an existing Blockchain account (or they can sign up for one via our
site). Next, the getBalance() function is used to determine if there are enough
funds in which to initiate an identity-verification transaction. If so, the first
transaction, ‘Tx-1’, which represents the initial identity-verification transaction,
is sent to the Certificate owner’s Bitcoin Address. Once ‘Tx-1’ is received by
the Certificate owner, the Certificate owner has the option to send the funds
back to the verifier in transaction ‘Tx-2’. Lastly, once ‘Tx-2’ is received by the
verifier, the transactions ‘Tx-1’ and ‘Tx-2’ are compared for equality. If they are
equal, the verifier can proceed to confirm the validity of the certificate and use it
for regular PGP certificate operations. Once the identity-verification transaction
is complete, the verifier will have the option of signing the Public Key of the
Certificate that was just verified. This function mirrors the traditional signing of
a Public Key, but differs in the fact that the signature will be added to the list
of Web of Trust signatures associated with the Public Key signed. It also results
in an endorsement for the signer - which is automatically sent to the signer’s
bitcoin address. The entire certificate endorsement process between a user Alice
and a user Bob is shown in below. As shown, this entire process is conducted
via our Bitcoin-Based PGP Key Server - making it very easy to endorse and
verify new PGP Keys. The server also supports the use of PGP keys for normal
operations such as encryption and decryption of standard ASCII text. After each
identity-verification transaction and certificate signing (endorsement) operation,
we provide a link to the transaction hash for external verification purposes (i.e.,
via the blockchain itself).
4.3 Blockchain PGP Key Server
In this subsection we describe the design of a novel PGP Key Server based on
the Bitcoin Transaction Blockchain. Historically, the use of bitcoins blockchain
to store data unrelated to bitcoin payments has been a controversial subject.
Many developers consider such use abusive and want to discourage it. Others
view it as a demonstration of the powerful capabilities of blockchain technology
and want to encourage such experimentation. Those who object to the inclusion
of non-payment data argue that it causes “blockchain bloat”, burdening those
running full bitcoin nodes with carrying the cost of disk storage for data that
the blockchain was not intended to carry. Moreover, such transactions create
UTXO that cannot be spent, using the destination bitcoin address as a free-
form 20-byte field. Because the address is used for data, it does not correspond
to a private key and the resulting UTXO can never be spent [24]. As a result,
these transactions continue to increase the size of the blockchain over time.
In version 0.9 of the Bitcoin Core client, a compromise was reached with the
introduction of the OP-RETURN operator. OP-RETURN allows developers
to add 40 bytes (now 80 bytes) of nonpayment data to a transaction output.
Certificate Endorsement Process 
Alice Server Bob 
Searches for Bob's PGP Key 
Selects Bob's PGP Key 
Click to Verify Bob's Key 
Logs into Blockchain Account 
Sends Verification Fee (Tx-1) 
Logs into Blockchain Account 
Verifies BTC amount sent 
Sends verificate Fee (Tx-2) 
Logs into Blockchain Account 
Compares (Tx-1) and (Tx-2) 
Sign Bob's PGP Key 
Send Endorsement Fee (0.001 BTC) 
alt [(Tx-1) == (Tx-2)] 
Disconnection Request 
[(Tx-1) != (Tx-2)] 
However, unlike the use of ”fake” UTXO, the OP-RETURN operator creates
an unspendable output, which does not need to be stored in the UTXO set.
OP-RETURN outputs are recorded on the blockchain, so they consume disk
space and contribute to the increase in the blockchains size, but they are not
stored in the UTXO set and therefore do not bloat the UTXO memory pool
and burden full nodes with the cost of more expensive RAM. [24]. As a result,
innovative decentralized applications such as the one subsequently described can
be realized. We focus our design discussions on storage and retrieval methods
we would employ in an actualization of a prototype application and summarize
with an overall component diagram.
STORAGE: Depending on the size of PGP key generated, the size could
range from 1018 bytes (1024-Bit key) to 3100 bytes (4096-Bit key). PGP
supports up to an 8192-Bit key which corresponds to an even larger on-disk or
memory capacity for storage purposes. Keeping this in mind, along with the
fact that the blockchain only accepts ‘data’ transactions of up to 80 bytes in
size, our storage leverages an innovative certificate fragmentation mechanism to
enable both logical storage and efficient retrieval. A message within our PGP
Key Server will consist of a 5 Byte Header which will include the PGP Key ID
(KeyID), Fragment ID (FID), Total Fragments (Total), and the Message Data.
Message format is shown below:
Upon initiating a storage request, a user will provide the KeyID and PGP
Key (Message Data) to the client application. The Bitcoin Address associated
with the PGP Key will also be extracted and provided as input - as it will be
required during the information retrieval process. The processing of each PGP
Key will take place as follows:
KeyID	   FID	   Total	   	  Message	  Data	  
80 Bytes 
4 Bytes 75 Bytes 4 Bits 4 Bits 
Fig. 1: Blockchain PGP Message
In short, this algorithm computes Bitcoin transactions for the PGP Key 75
bytes at a time since this is the allowed size of our PGP Key Server messages
(given the header of 5 bytes). A few things to note: Total Fragments denote the
number of fragments there will be given the size of the PGP Certificate. In the
simplest example, a PGP key of size 75 bytes will result in a Total Fragment
computation of 1. The round function (or similar) will have to be used to ensure
that the Total Fragment count is a whole number. The Pointer variable is used
to both split and process each PGP Key segment from the beginning of the PGP
Key to its end. Prior to discussing the retrieval method we employ, there are a
number of similar libraries in existence that are used for similar purposes (i.e.,
to store data in the Bitcoin transaction blockchain. It is helpful to describe a
few of the key ones here: 1) Coinspark allows you to Add messages to bitcoin
transactions and Transfer any asset over the Internet, 2) Coinsecrets enables OP-
RETURN transactions to be retrieved from the bitcoin or testnet blockchains, as
well as unconfirmed transactions from the memory pool. Their API also parses
the content of the OP-RETURNs for display in decoded form, and 3) Factom
is leveraged by Businesses and governments to simplify records management,
record business processes, and address security and compliance issues [25,26,27].
RETRIEVAL: The Retrieval of a PGP Key from the blockchain requires
several steps that mirrors (in reverse) the storage operations performed. Similar
to the defragmentation process of an IP datagram. The steps are as follows:
1. User requests Bitcoin-Address, KeyID from Client application (Bitcoin-Address
is used to identify OP-RETURN transactions associated with KeyID.
2. Application Searches Blockchain for OP-RETURN transactions associated
with Bitcoin-Address (using the chain.com API) and stores transactions in
Results Array.
3. Application Extracts KeyID from Element[0] of Results array element
4. Application Verifies that KeyID matches KeyID from Step 1
5. Application Extracts Total Fragments from Element[0] of Results array ele-
ment
6. Application Verifies number of transactions (Results Array Length) retrieved
equals Total Fragments in PGP Key Message
Input: PGP-Key, PGP-Key-Length, PGP-Key-ID, Bitcoin Address
Result: TRUE or FALSE
ChunkSize=75; Pointer=0;
Total Fragments=PGP-Key-Length / 75;
Index=0;
Result=FALSE;
Fee=0.001;
while (Pointer LESS THAN PGP-Key-Length) do
DATA = readKey (PGP-Key, Pointer, ChunkSize);
if more DATA then
Header = [PGP-Key-ID + Index + Total Fragments];
Send-Message (Header, DATA, Bitcoin Address, Fee);
Index = Index + 1;
Pointer = Pointer + Chunksize;
Process Next Chunk (Continue);
else
Done Processing;
Result=TRUE;
end
Return Result;
end
Algorithm 1: Process PGP Key
7. If ALL transactions were retrieved successfully, Application reorders Mes-
sages and stores Messages in Ordered-Results Array
8. Reassemble PGP Key from Ordered-Results Array
9. Utilize PGP Key for Normal Operations (Sign, Verify, Encrypt, Decrypt)
Chain’s enterprise-grade block chain API makes it easy to build Bitcoin ap-
plications that are fast, reliable, and secure [28]. The Get Bitcoin Address OP-
RETURN function returns any OP-RETURN values sent and received by a
Bitcoin Address in an Array of OP-RETURN OBJECTS. The OP-RETURN
OBJECT is a pseudo-object that is extracted from the Transaction Object. It
is an interpretation of the OP-RETURN script within a zero-value output in
a Bitcoin transaction. The OP-RETURN can be used to include 80 bytes of
metadata in a Bitcoin transaction. Each OP-RETURN OBJECT Contains the
following data that we leverage for step 2 above. Lastly, it is important to note
that the OP-RETURN data will have to be decoded prior to being used. This
decoding process is elegantly handled by the chain API. This decoded text is the
contents of our message that we specify in step 2 above. We conclude this section
with a overview diagram (Figure 2) of how each PGP message fragment looks
within the overall structure of the Bitcoin Transaction Blockchain. It is highly
probable that each message could be contained in a disparate block within the
transaction blockchain. Thus the header is vital in ensuring the retrieval process
works seamlessly. In Figure 2, we demonstrate a sample message broken into six
message fragments and stored in three separate transaction blocks.
Fig. 2: PGP Message Stored in Transaction Blockchain
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5 Prototype Demonstration Output
In this section, we walk through the steps of using our prototype application to
perform the bitcoin identity-verifications functions and the output produced by
our application at each stage (as applicable).
1. Alice (Certificate Owner) Generates Bitcoin-Based PGP Certificate:
Key-Type: RSA
Name-Comment:
1Lk3XuR3dvPebRS6QgmVXVBjm7NBkuTuM7|
19X3kcrYNFhaPdwpdwnnBrDSNtecxUqDrW
Passphrase: pwd
Name-Real: Alice
Name-Email: alice@bitcoinpgp.com
Key-Length: 2048
%commit
2. Alice sends Certificate to Bob (no output - performed out of band)
3. Bob sends Identity-Verification transaction to embedded Bitcoin Address
Current Balance is: 0.033673
How much would you like to send for
VERIFICATION TRANSACTION? 0.00856179
Sending 0.00856179 to
1Lk3XuR3dvPebRS6QgmVXVBjm7NBkuTuM7
4. Alice sends Identity-Verification funds back to Bob’s Bitcoin address
Current Balance is: 0.01198579
How much would you like to send for
RETURN VERIFICATION TRANSACTION?
0.00856179 Sending 0.00856179 to
1HiLRA7pC3d6mLGUpuhx3qH4G8sDVbdpD2
5. Bob checks for return of Identity-Verification funds
Amount Sent: 0.00856179
Transaction of 0.00856179 Found!
Result = True
6. Bob checks Alice’s certificate for validity (result true)
7. Alice (at later date) revokes her certificate
Sent Revocation Transaction of Amount:
0.000017 to Revocation Address:
19X3kcrYNFhaPdwpdwnnBrDSNtecxUqDrW
1Lk3XuR3dvPebRS6QgmVXVBjm7NBkuTuM7
Certificate Successfully Revoked
8. Bob checks Alice’s certificate for validity
Bitcoin Address Verified
Amount Sent: 0.000017
Revoke Transaction of 0.000017 Found!
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we presented a number of enhancements to PGP and associated
Web of Trust - which has suffered from a littany of issues since its inception.
Specific issues of certification, endorsement, and ambiguous levels of trust have
prevented its wide scale adoption. The contributions we discuss include a novel
Bitcoin-Based PGP Certificate format, Design of a Distributed PGP Key Server
- using the Bitcoin transaction blockchain for certificate storage and retrieval,
Certificate Signing Endorsements, and Identity-verification and revocation trans-
actions using Bitcoin. We demonstrate how these added features and capabilities
can potentially result in a greater use of PGP which has inherently proven se-
curity properties. Future work will consist of examining alternative methods
of employing Bitcoin for identity-verification using actual Bitcoin Distributed
Contracts or alternative methods that do not require modification of the orig-
inal PGP certificate format. Keybase.io allows you to get a public key, safely,
starting just with someone’s social media username(s), but also provides other
mechanisms of verifying a particular key (e.g., pgp fingerprint and bitcoin ad-
dresses) [29]. In other words, it provides a compendium of online identifiers for
a particular owner of a public key stored on their servers. A potential area for
future work would be to enable verifiers to leverage one or more of the online iden-
tifications provided by Keybase.io to strengthen the trust of certificate stored on
our server (via their API). Additionally, the integration of Bitcoin-Based PGP
Certificates into infrastructures where secure sharing is offered (via text mes-
saging, chat applications, and Secure Cloud Storage servers) would demonstrate
their usefulness in actual environments. Lastly, a stronger form of certificate
revocation should be explored that builds on the procedure we present in our
research. We are currently working on a prototype of the Distributed Key Server
that will also address some of the privacy issues found in the traditional PGP
Key Servers (e.g., MIT). Our Enhanced PGP Key Server is currently hosted at
[http://enhancedpgp.com/].
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